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Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
(1874)

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Downloading books is available only for authorized users

Sull'utilità e il danno della storia per la vita On the Use and Abuse of History for Life

Prefazione Foreword

“Del resto per me è odioso tutto ciò che si limita ad istruirmi senza aumentare o stimolare immediatamente la mia capacità d’azione”. Queste sono parole di Goethe[1] con le quali, come con un Ceterum censeo[2] espresso con vigore, si può dare inizio alla nostra considerazione sul valore e il disvalore della storia. Nella stessa, infatti, dovrebbe essere descritto perché un’istruzione senza stimolo, perché un sapere nel quale la capacità d’azione si affloscia, perché la storia come rara superfluità di conoscenza e lusso, secondo le parole di Goethe, devono essere per noi davvero odiosi – proprio perché manchiamo ancora dello stretto necessario e dato che il superfluo è nemico del necessario. Certamente necessitiamo della storia, ma ne abbiamo bisogno in un modo diverso rispetto a quello del fannullone viziato nel giardino del sapere, anche se quest’ultimo potrebbe persino guardare in modo altezzoso alle nostre esigenze e necessità rozze e senza grazia. Ciò significa che abbiamo bisogno della storia per la vita e l’azione, non per ritirarci comodamente dalla vita e dall’azione, o, soprattutto, non per abbellire una vita ripiegata su di sé o un’azione abietta e malvagia. Solo fintantoché la storia serve alla vita, noi vogliamo servire lei: ma c’è una forza a spingere la storia e una sua valutazione, nella quale la vita si atrofizza e degenera, un fenomeno che è ora necessario (tanto quanto potrebbe essere doloroso) sperimentare in sintomi del nostro tempo degni di attenzione.

Mi sono sforzato di illustrare una sensazione che mi ha tormentato abbastanza spesso; mi vendico di lei rendendola pubblica. Forse qualcuno sarà spinto da una tale descrizione a spiegarmi che anch’egli conosce questa sensazione, ma che io non l’ho sentita in maniera abbastanza pura e originaria e che non l’ho assolutamente espressa con la dovuta sicurezza e maturità dell’esperienza. Così forse l’uno o l’altro; per lo più, però, mi diranno che è una sensazione sbagliata, innaturale, deplorevole e del tutto illecita, che mi sono mostrato indegno nei suoi riguardi del potente senso storico-temporale osservabile, notoriamente, da due generazioni soprattutto fra i Tedeschi. Ora, in ogni modo, osando io saltar fuori con la descrizione naturale della mia sensazione, il decoro generale risulta incrementato piuttosto che danneggiato, offrendo io molte occasioni di fare osservazioni gentili ad una tale corrente del tempo come quella appena nominata. Ma per me ottengo qualcosa che è di maggior valore del decoro generale – essere pubblicamente illuminato e rimproverato riguardo a questo tempo.

Inattuale è anche questa considerazione, perché cerco di comprendere ciò di cui il tempo è (di volta in volta e a buon diritto) orgoglioso come danno, difetto e mancanza, perché credo persino che noi tutti soffriamo di una febbre storica che consuma e almeno dovremmo riconoscere che ne soffriamo. Ma se Goethe a buon diritto ha affermato che coltiviamo con le nostre virtù così come con i nostri errori, e se, come ognuno sa, una virtù ipertrofica – come mi sembra essere il senso storico del nostro tempo – può diventare un vizio ipertrofico volto alla distruzione di un popolo: così me lo si conceda almeno una volta. E per alleggerire la mia colpa non deve essere taciuto che le esperienze che mi causarono tormentose sensazioni sono state tratte da me stesso e dagli altri per fare un paragone, e che, in quanto discepolo di un tempo più antico, particolarmente di quello greco, arrivo ad esperienze così inattuali come figlio del tempo attuale. Ma molto mi dovrei poter concedere a causa del lavoro come filologo classico, perché non saprei quale senso avrebbe la filologia classica nella nostra epoca, se non quello di mostrarsi in essa inattuale – cioè contro il tempo e, speriamo, a vantaggio di un tempo a venire.

[1] GOETHE, Johann Wolfgang von (Francoforte sul Meno 1749 – Weimar 1832). Scrittore e pensatore (interessi per la filosofia e le scienze naturali). Anni di formazione coincidenti con il periodo dello Sturm und Drang, al quale contribuisce con il romanzo epistolare I dolori del giovane Werther (1774). A partire dal 1775 risiede a Weimar, viaggia in Italia (1786), si occupa di politica. Fra le sue numerosissime opere (poesia, drammi, trattati scientifici, lettere, diari) si ricordino: le Elegie romane (1795), il romanzo Le affinità elettive (1809), La teoria dei colori (1810), Gli anni di apprendistato di Wilhelm Meister (1821-29) eil dramma Faust (I parte 1808; II parte 1832). Insieme a Schiller esercita un’influenza fondamentale sul Romanticismo tedesco ed europeo.
[2] Ritengo del resto.

“Incidentally, I despise everything which merely instructs me without increasing or immediately enlivening my activity.” These are Goethe's words. With them, as with a heartfelt expression of Ceterum censeo (I judge otherwise), our consideration of the worth and the worthlessness of history may begin. For this work is to set down why, in the spirit of Goethe's saying, we must seriously despise instruction without vitality, knowledge which enervates activity, and history as an expensive surplus of knowledge and a luxury, because we lack what is still most essential to us and because what is superfluous is hostile to what is essential. To be sure, we need history. But we need it in a manner different from the way in which the spoilt idler in the garden of knowledge uses it, no matter how elegantly he may look down on our coarse and graceless needs and distresses. That is, we need it for life and action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and action or merely for glossing over the egotistical life and the cowardly bad act. We wish to use history only insofar as it serves living. But there is a degree of doing history and a valuing of it through which life atrophies and degenerates. To bring this phenomenon to light as a remarkable symptom of our time is every bit as necessary as it may be painful.

I have tried to describe a feeling which has often enough tormented me. I take my revenge on this feeling when I expose it to the general public. Perhaps with such a description someone or other will have reason to point out to me that he also knows this particular sensation but that I have not felt it with sufficient purity and naturalness and definitely have not expressed myself with the appropriate certainty and mature experience. Perhaps one or two will respond in this way. However, most people will tell me that this feeling is totally wrong, unnatural, abominable, and absolutely forbidden, that with it, in fact, I have shown myself unworthy of the powerful historical tendency of the times, as it has been, by common knowledge, observed for the past two generations, particularly among the Germans. Whatever the reaction, now that I dare to expose myself with this natural description of my feeling, common decency will be fostered rather than shamed, because I am providing many opportunities for a contemporary tendency like the reaction just mentioned to make polite pronouncements. Moreover, I obtain for myself something of even more value to me than respectability: I become publicly instructed and set straight about our times.

This essay is also out of touch with the times because here I am trying for once to see as a contemporary disgrace, infirmity, and defect something of which our age is justifiably proud, its historical culture. For I believe, in fact, that we are all suffering from a consumptive historical fever and at the very least should recognize that we are afflicted with it. If Goethe with good reason said that with our virtues we simultaneously cultivate our faults and if, as everyone knows, a hypertrophic virtue (as the historical sense of our age appears to me to be) can serve to destroy a people just as well as a hypertrophic vice, then
Space for Notes people may make allowance for me this once. Also in my defense I should not conceal the fact that the experiences which aroused these feelings of torment in me I have derived for the most part from myself and only from others for the purpose of comparison and that, insofar as I am a student more of ancient times, particularly the Greeks, I come as a child in these present times to such anachronistic experiences concerning myself. But I must be allowed to ascribe this much to myself on account of my profession as a classical philologue, for I would not know what sense classical philology would have in our age unless it is to be effective by its inappropriateness for the times, that is, in opposition to the age, thus working on the age, and, we hope, for the benefit of a coming time.

Friedrich Nietzsche

well: You use well to say that something was done in a good way.
among: If you are among certain things, they are all around you.
describe: To describe is to say or write what someone or something is like.
ever: Ever means at any time.
appropriate: When a thing is appropriate, it is right or normal.
concern: Concern is a feeling of worry.
instruct: To instruct is to teach.
experience: An experience is something you have seen or done.
cause: To cause is to make something happen.
wise: To be wise is to use experience and intelligence to make good choices.
allow: To allow something to happen means to let it happen.
sense: To sense something is to know about it without being told.
necessary: If something is necessary, you must do it.
purpose: A purpose is the reason that you do something.
still: Still is used when you say that a situation keeps going on.
benefit: A benefit is a good thing.
certain: If you are certain about something, you know it is true.
effect: An effect is a change made by something else.
essential: If something is essential, it is very important and necessary.
far: If something is far, it is not close.
immediate: If something is immediate, it happens quickly.
proud: If someone feels proud, they are happy about what they have done.
serious: When something is serious, it is bad or unsafe.
judge: To judge something is to say if it is good or bad.
thin: If someone or something is thin, they are not fat.
owe: To owe is to have to pay or give back something received from another.
position: A position is the way something is placed.
description: A description of someone or something says what they are like.
suffer: To suffer is to feel pain.
observe: To observe something is to watch it.
race: A race is a contest to see who is the fastest.
respond: To respond is to give an answer to what someone else said.
ancient: If something is ancient, it is very old.
mention: To mention something is to talk about it.
bit: A bit is a small amount of something.
consider: To consider something means to think about it.
destroy: To destroy means to damage something so badly that it cannot be used.
lie: To lie is to say or write something untrue to deceive someone.
serve: To serve someone is to give them food or drinks.
war: A war is a big fight between two groups of people.
worth: If something is worth an amount of money, it costs that amount.
appear: To appear is to seem.
pain: Pain is the feeling that you have when you are hurt.
comfort: To comfort someone means to make them feel better.
set: To set something is to put it somewhere.
fit: If something fits, it is small enough orthe right size to go there.
lack: If there is a lack of something, there is not enough of it.
public: If something is public, it is meant for everyone to use.
recognize: To recognize something is to know it because you have seen it before.
otherwise: Otherwise means different or in another way.
react: To react is to act in a certain way because of something that happened.
effective: If something is effective, it works well.
rather: Rather is used when you want to do one thing but not the other.
value: If something has value, it is worth a lot of money.
own: To own something means to have it. That thing belongs to you.
knowledge: Knowledge is information that you have about something.
respect: Respect is a good opinion of someone because they are good.
rich: If you are rich, you have a lot of money.
common: If something is common, it happens often or there is much of it.
different: Different describes someone or something that is not the same as others.

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Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1874)

Downloading books is available only for authorized users
Downloading books is available only for authorized users
Sull'utilità e il danno della storia per la vita		On the Use and Abuse of History for Life
Prefazione		Foreword
“Del resto per me è odioso tutto ciò che si limita ad istruirmi senza aumentare o stimolare immediatamente la mia capacità d’azione”. Queste sono parole di Goethe[1] con le quali, come con un Ceterum censeo[2] espresso con vigore, si può dare inizio alla nostra considerazione sul valore e il disvalore della storia. Nella stessa, infatti, dovrebbe essere descritto perché un’istruzione senza stimolo, perché un sapere nel quale la capacità d’azione si affloscia, perché la storia come rara superfluità di conoscenza e lusso, secondo le parole di Goethe, devono essere per noi davvero odiosi – proprio perché manchiamo ancora dello stretto necessario e dato che il superfluo è nemico del necessario. Certamente necessitiamo della storia, ma ne abbiamo bisogno in un modo diverso rispetto a quello del fannullone viziato nel giardino del sapere, anche se quest’ultimo potrebbe persino guardare in modo altezzoso alle nostre esigenze e necessità rozze e senza grazia. Ciò significa che abbiamo bisogno della storia per la vita e l’azione, non per ritirarci comodamente dalla vita e dall’azione, o, soprattutto, non per abbellire una vita ripiegata su di sé o un’azione abietta e malvagia. Solo fintantoché la storia serve alla vita, noi vogliamo servire lei: ma c’è una forza a spingere la storia e una sua valutazione, nella quale la vita si atrofizza e degenera, un fenomeno che è ora necessario (tanto quanto potrebbe essere doloroso) sperimentare in sintomi del nostro tempo degni di attenzione. Mi sono sforzato di illustrare una sensazione che mi ha tormentato abbastanza spesso; mi vendico di lei rendendola pubblica. Forse qualcuno sarà spinto da una tale descrizione a spiegarmi che anch’egli conosce questa sensazione, ma che io non l’ho sentita in maniera abbastanza pura e originaria e che non l’ho assolutamente espressa con la dovuta sicurezza e maturità dell’esperienza. Così forse l’uno o l’altro; per lo più, però, mi diranno che è una sensazione sbagliata, innaturale, deplorevole e del tutto illecita, che mi sono mostrato indegno nei suoi riguardi del potente senso storico-temporale osservabile, notoriamente, da due generazioni soprattutto fra i Tedeschi. Ora, in ogni modo, osando io saltar fuori con la descrizione naturale della mia sensazione, il decoro generale risulta incrementato piuttosto che danneggiato, offrendo io molte occasioni di fare osservazioni gentili ad una tale corrente del tempo come quella appena nominata. Ma per me ottengo qualcosa che è di maggior valore del decoro generale – essere pubblicamente illuminato e rimproverato riguardo a questo tempo. Inattuale è anche questa considerazione, perché cerco di comprendere ciò di cui il tempo è (di volta in volta e a buon diritto) orgoglioso come danno, difetto e mancanza, perché credo persino che noi tutti soffriamo di una febbre storica che consuma e almeno dovremmo riconoscere che ne soffriamo. Ma se Goethe a buon diritto ha affermato che coltiviamo con le nostre virtù così come con i nostri errori, e se, come ognuno sa, una virtù ipertrofica – come mi sembra essere il senso storico del nostro tempo – può diventare un vizio ipertrofico volto alla distruzione di un popolo: così me lo si conceda almeno una volta. E per alleggerire la mia colpa non deve essere taciuto che le esperienze che mi causarono tormentose sensazioni sono state tratte da me stesso e dagli altri per fare un paragone, e che, in quanto discepolo di un tempo più antico, particolarmente di quello greco, arrivo ad esperienze così inattuali come figlio del tempo attuale. Ma molto mi dovrei poter concedere a causa del lavoro come filologo classico, perché non saprei quale senso avrebbe la filologia classica nella nostra epoca, se non quello di mostrarsi in essa inattuale – cioè contro il tempo e, speriamo, a vantaggio di un tempo a venire. [1] GOETHE, Johann Wolfgang von (Francoforte sul Meno 1749 – Weimar 1832). Scrittore e pensatore (interessi per la filosofia e le scienze naturali). Anni di formazione coincidenti con il periodo dello Sturm und Drang, al quale contribuisce con il romanzo epistolare I dolori del giovane Werther (1774). A partire dal 1775 risiede a Weimar, viaggia in Italia (1786), si occupa di politica. Fra le sue numerosissime opere (poesia, drammi, trattati scientifici, lettere, diari) si ricordino: le Elegie romane (1795), il romanzo Le affinità elettive (1809), La teoria dei colori (1810), Gli anni di apprendistato di Wilhelm Meister (1821-29) eil dramma Faust (I parte 1808; II parte 1832). Insieme a Schiller esercita un’influenza fondamentale sul Romanticismo tedesco ed europeo. [2] Ritengo del resto.		“Incidentally, I despise everything which merely instructs me without increasing or immediately enlivening my activity.” These are Goethe's words. With them, as with a heartfelt expression of Ceterum censeo (I judge otherwise), our consideration of the worth and the worthlessness of history may begin. For this work is to set down why, in the spirit of Goethe's saying, we must seriously despise instruction without vitality, knowledge which enervates activity, and history as an expensive surplus of knowledge and a luxury, because we lack what is still most essential to us and because what is superfluous is hostile to what is essential. To be sure, we need history. But we need it in a manner different from the way in which the spoilt idler in the garden of knowledge uses it, no matter how elegantly he may look down on our coarse and graceless needs and distresses. That is, we need it for life and action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and action or merely for glossing over the egotistical life and the cowardly bad act. We wish to use history only insofar as it serves living. But there is a degree of doing history and a valuing of it through which life atrophies and degenerates. To bring this phenomenon to light as a remarkable symptom of our time is every bit as necessary as it may be painful. I have tried to describe a feeling which has often enough tormented me. I take my revenge on this feeling when I expose it to the general public. Perhaps with such a description someone or other will have reason to point out to me that he also knows this particular sensation but that I have not felt it with sufficient purity and naturalness and definitely have not expressed myself with the appropriate certainty and mature experience. Perhaps one or two will respond in this way. However, most people will tell me that this feeling is totally wrong, unnatural, abominable, and absolutely forbidden, that with it, in fact, I have shown myself unworthy of the powerful historical tendency of the times, as it has been, by common knowledge, observed for the past two generations, particularly among the Germans. Whatever the reaction, now that I dare to expose myself with this natural description of my feeling, common decency will be fostered rather than shamed, because I am providing many opportunities for a contemporary tendency like the reaction just mentioned to make polite pronouncements. Moreover, I obtain for myself something of even more value to me than respectability: I become publicly instructed and set straight about our times. This essay is also out of touch with the times because here I am trying for once to see as a contemporary disgrace, infirmity, and defect something of which our age is justifiably proud, its historical culture. For I believe, in fact, that we are all suffering from a consumptive historical fever and at the very least should recognize that we are afflicted with it. If Goethe with good reason said that with our virtues we simultaneously cultivate our faults and if, as everyone knows, a hypertrophic virtue (as the historical sense of our age appears to me to be) can serve to destroy a people just as well as a hypertrophic vice, then Space for Notes people may make allowance for me this once. Also in my defense I should not conceal the fact that the experiences which aroused these feelings of torment in me I have derived for the most part from myself and only from others for the purpose of comparison and that, insofar as I am a student more of ancient times, particularly the Greeks, I come as a child in these present times to such anachronistic experiences concerning myself. But I must be allowed to ascribe this much to myself on account of my profession as a classical philologue, for I would not know what sense classical philology would have in our age unless it is to be effective by its inappropriateness for the times, that is, in opposition to the age, thus working on the age, and, we hope, for the benefit of a coming time. Friedrich Nietzsche
		well: You use well to say that something was done in a good way. among: If you are among certain things, they are all around you. describe: To describe is to say or write what someone or something is like. ever: Ever means at any time. appropriate: When a thing is appropriate, it is right or normal. concern: Concern is a feeling of worry. instruct: To instruct is to teach. experience: An experience is something you have seen or done. cause: To cause is to make something happen. wise: To be wise is to use experience and intelligence to make good choices. allow: To allow something to happen means to let it happen. sense: To sense something is to know about it without being told. necessary: If something is necessary, you must do it. purpose: A purpose is the reason that you do something. still: Still is used when you say that a situation keeps going on. benefit: A benefit is a good thing. certain: If you are certain about something, you know it is true. effect: An effect is a change made by something else. essential: If something is essential, it is very important and necessary. far: If something is far, it is not close. immediate: If something is immediate, it happens quickly. proud: If someone feels proud, they are happy about what they have done. serious: When something is serious, it is bad or unsafe. judge: To judge something is to say if it is good or bad. thin: If someone or something is thin, they are not fat. owe: To owe is to have to pay or give back something received from another. position: A position is the way something is placed. description: A description of someone or something says what they are like. suffer: To suffer is to feel pain. observe: To observe something is to watch it. race: A race is a contest to see who is the fastest. respond: To respond is to give an answer to what someone else said. ancient: If something is ancient, it is very old. mention: To mention something is to talk about it. bit: A bit is a small amount of something. consider: To consider something means to think about it. destroy: To destroy means to damage something so badly that it cannot be used. lie: To lie is to say or write something untrue to deceive someone. serve: To serve someone is to give them food or drinks. war: A war is a big fight between two groups of people. worth: If something is worth an amount of money, it costs that amount. appear: To appear is to seem. pain: Pain is the feeling that you have when you are hurt. comfort: To comfort someone means to make them feel better. set: To set something is to put it somewhere. fit: If something fits, it is small enough orthe right size to go there. lack: If there is a lack of something, there is not enough of it. public: If something is public, it is meant for everyone to use. recognize: To recognize something is to know it because you have seen it before. otherwise: Otherwise means different or in another way. react: To react is to act in a certain way because of something that happened. effective: If something is effective, it works well. rather: Rather is used when you want to do one thing but not the other. value: If something has value, it is worth a lot of money. own: To own something means to have it. That thing belongs to you. knowledge: Knowledge is information that you have about something. respect: Respect is a good opinion of someone because they are good. rich: If you are rich, you have a lot of money. common: If something is common, it happens often or there is much of it. different: Different describes someone or something that is not the same as others.

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